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FRIENDS AND ALLIES: 
THE TONKAWA INDIANS AND THE 
ANGLO .. AMERICANS, 1823 .. 1884 
THOMAS W. DUNLAY 
Historical models of Indian-white contact on 
the frontier emphasize conflict and hostility, 
yet historians are not unaware that whites and 
Indians interacted in many different ways in 
different regions and time periods. Even in 
cases of Indian-white conflict, it was not at all 
uncommon to find Indians fighting beside the 
whites against other Indians, often greatly 
enhancing the capabilities of the white forces. 
Some tribes were notable for their long-stand-
ing alliance with whites against other Indian 
tribes; examples include the Catawbas of South 
Carolina, the Pawnees of Nebraska, the Wyo-
ming Shoshonis led by Chief Washakie, and the 
Crows of Montana. 
A particularly striking example is the Ton-
kawa tribe of Texas, whose military cooperation 
with the Anglo-Americans, though intermittent, 
covered more than half a century. For the 
Tonkawas it was a period of repeated disasters 
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and inexorable decline, during which they were 
forced into increasing dependence on the 
whites for survival. For the military forces of 
Texas and the United States, the Tonkawas' 
assistance meant a sometimes decisive improve-
ment in their ability to cope with the Coman-
ches and other tribes of the southern plains. 
The reason for the Tonkawas' peculiar 
relation to the whites lay in their status in rela-
tion to other tribes in the region. According to 
eighteenth-century Spanish officials they were 
"disliked and even abhorred" by other Indians, 
although they were sometimes included in 
alliances of convenience. In the nineteenth 
century Captain Randolph Marcy described 
them as "renegades and aliens from all social 
intercourse with the other tribes." Captain 
John Ford of the Texas Rangers noted that 
they were the "black beasts" of the Brazos 
River Reservation in the 1850s, blamed by the 
other tribes located there for causing, through 
sorcery, various unfortunate occurrences. Even 
in the twentieth century older members of 
various southern plains tribes described them as 
witches. 1 
Why was this small, nomadic hunting tribe 
in such bad repute with its neighbors? The 
obvious and often-cited reason was their known 
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cannibalism. There are enough accounts from 
eyewitnesses to confIrm beyond reasonable 
doubt that the Tonkawas did, on occasion, 
have ceremonies in which they ate portions of 
their dead enemies, undoubtedly for religious 
purposes. For this reason, members of various 
tribes asserted, they killed Tonkawas when 
the opportunity offered, especially if they 
believed one of their kinsmen had recently 
been devoured by the abhorred tribe. Every 
man's hand was against them, and their hand 
. 2 
was agamst every man. 
Yet there may have been an element of 
hypocrisy and rationalization in this attitude. 
The Comanches evidently found the Tonkawas' 
habits tolerable when the two tribes were 
allies against the Apaches in the 1700s. The 
Comanches and other tribes of Texas were ac-
cuse4 of similar practices, though the evidence 
is not clear. It seems fairly certain that the 
Karankawas of the Gulf Coast, believed to be 
linguistically related to the Tonkawas, also ate 
human flesh. Perhaps the Tonkawas were 
particularly blatant and enthusiastic in their 
anthropophagy, and perhaps they clung to 
it in a period when other tribes were giving it 
up. Some historians suggest that the special 
hatred for the Tonkawas arose from their 
assistance to the whites, rather than vice versa, 
yet the attitude apparently existed in the 
eighteenth century when the Tonkawas were 
by no means on friendly terms with the Spanish. 
In any case, once they were established as 
pariahs and scapegoats, the common attitude 
apparently supplied its own confIrmation: 
persecution no doubt prompted responses that 
in turn seemed sufficient justifIcation for 
further persecution.3 
The white response to the Tonkawas is 
equally interesting because of its contrast with 
present-day preconceived images of frontiers-
men and their relations with Indians. The leg-
endary Westerner supposedly believed that the 
only good Indian was a dead one, and the 
storybook Texan, in particular, never bothered 
to count the number of Indians he had killed. 
Examination of the facts, however, suggests 
greater complexity. The Texas frontiersman, 
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especially before the Civil War, was often glad 
to have the help of friendly Indians. Those 
Texans par excellence, the Rangers, won many 
of their victories with the help of Indian scouts 
and fIghting auxiliaries. The Lipan Apaches, as 
well as the Tonkawas, were frequent allies of 
the Rangers in the days of the Republic; Cap-
tain Jack Hays, the first great Ranger captain, 
charged a band of Comanches in company 
with the Lipan chief FIacco. The most artic-
ulate of Ranger leaders, John S. "Old Rip" 
Ford, freely acknowledged the value of the 
Indians' services in his victory over the Coman-
ches north of the Red River in 1858. If these 
allies do not fIgure largely in the histories of 
the Rangers, it may be because they do not fit 
in well with the myth of the heroic frontiers-
man. 4 
The situation was by no means unprece-
dented. From colonial days frontier Indian 
fIghters had found it necessary both to adopt 
Indian fighting methods and to secure the aid 
of other Indians, trained from childhood in 
skills that few whites, starting later in life, 
could fully learn. There were always some 
whites on the frontier who recognized Indians 
as individual people. The good Indian was not 
necessarily a dead one; he might also be an 
Indian on the side of the whites. The attitude 
was not so much, perhaps, one of Hawkeye-
Chingachgook comradeship as one of pragmatic 
cooperation for mutual advantage. Yet the 
unrelenting "Indian-hater," who made no 
distinction between tribes, was generally less 
knowledgeable and less successful, even in 
combat, than the man who could come to some 
sort of agreement with some Indians. 
Clearly the Tonkawas were cooperating with 
the whites fairly frequently by the 1830s. 
They were scouts for the Texas army in the war 
with the Cherokees in 1839, and they played 
a distinguished part in the victory over a 
massive Comanche raiding party at plum Creek 
in 1840. They entered the latter engagement 
on foot, running beside the Texan horsemen, 
and emerged mounted on Comanche horses. 
They sometimes served as scouts against Mexi-
can forces in the same period, and Texans may 
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have encouraged them to attack Mexicans on 
their own. A traveler in the Republic in 1842 
reported that the Tonkawas "are of much 
service as spies, and always give the alarm when 
the Camanches [sic 1 come in.,,5 
Yet this cooperation and battlefield com-
radeship was always interwoven with mutual 
suspicion and fear and with conte~pt on the 
part of many whites. In the 1820s Stephen 
Austin forced Chief Carita to flog five of his 
tribesmen for stealing. There were always 
episodes where whites, justly or not, accused 
Tonkawas of. stealing food or livestock, or 
worse. Rip Ford reported an episode of 1849 in 
which two Tonkawas were accused of eating a 
white man. They admitted the act but excused 
themselves on the ground that he was not really 
a white man, but a German-an indication that 
the Indians had picked up their white neigh-
bors' prejudices to the extent of trying to play 
on' them. When all reservation Indians were 
driven from Texas in 1859, the Tonkawas 
had to go, although many Rangers and experi-
enced frontiersmen doubted the justice or the 
wisdom of the move, or the accusations of 
crime that prompted it. 6 
By the late 1350s the Tonkawas were coop-
erating with federal forces as well as with the 
Rangers. Some accompanied a small expedition 
against the Kickapoos in 1857. In 1858, besides 
their services with Ford's Rangers, the Ton-
kawas and other Brazos Reserve Indians were in 
Major Earl Van Dorn's bloody victory over the 
Comanches in Indian Territory. The forced 
removal of the Tonkawas caused some bitter 
feelings against the Texans, yet in 1860 mem-
bers of the tribe were again campaigning with 
the Rangers in Indian TerritoryJ 
To the Tonkawas the Civil War brought 
disaster. Residing near Fort Cobb, Indian Terri-
tory, at its outbreak, they chose to sign a treaty 
of friendship with the Confederacy. This action 
really amounted to a continuation of their 
historic relationship with the Texans. On Octo-
ber 23, 1862, various tribes ostensibly of Union 
affiliation attacked the Confederate Indian 
agency at Fort Cobb and followed this up with 
a massacre of the nearby Tonkawa village. One 
hundred thirty-seven Tonkawas reportedly 
died, including Chief Placido, who had fre-
quently led his warriors against other tribes for 
the whites. The massacre may have been either 
in revenge for the alleged eating of a Caddo 
boy or the result of the Tonkawas' Confed-
erate sympathies. In any case, it is likely that 
the participants paid off a number of old 
scores. 8 
After this disaster the remaining Tonkawas 
seem to have split temporarily. A portion re-
mained in Indian Territory and scouted for 
Confederate Chickasaw Indian cavalry. The 
remainder returned to Texas, asked to be 
allowed to live there, and offered their services 
to the state against the Comanches. Some state 
and Confederate authorities found the idea 
attractive, among them John R. Baylor, who a 
few years earlier had been the leader of the 
movement to remove the reservation Indians. 
He now assured the Tonkawas that he wanted 
to avenge the death of his old friend, Chief 
Placido.9 
Texas was in need of the Tonkawas' services, 
for the Confederacy never was able to provide 
adequate frontier defense, and the state suf-
fered from the general decline of the currency. 
Yet bureaucratic and legislative slowness, divi-
sion of authority between state and Confed-
eracy, and lack of funds apparently prevented 
full utilization of the Tonkawas' willingness to 
serve. While most of the noncombatants lin-
gered about the settlements, begging for food, a 
portion of the fighting men did participate as 
scouts in various operations against the hostile 
tribes. Ranger leader Buck Barry remembered 
Chief Castile from this period as "my friend 
and clever scout.,,10 
After the war most of the surviving Ton-
kawas were still in Texas and had been joined 
by a few Lipans. They had no place to go, for 
they feared to return to Indian Territory and 
there was no reservation for them in Texas. By 
early 1867 Governor ]. W. Throckmorton of 
Texas concluded that living around the settle-
ments had left the tribe so "demoralized" 
that nothing could be done with them except 
by military force. Eventually he was able to 
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Tonkawa Indian scouts at Fort Elliott, Texas. Courtesy of the Panhandle-plains Historical 
Museum, Canyon, Texas. 
persuade the federal military to take over 
custody of the tribe. In 1867 they were domi-
ciled for a time at Fort Belknap, then moved to 
the new Fort Griffin on the Clear Fork of the 
Brazos River when Fort Belknap was aban-
doned. 
This relocation provided a temporary solu-
tion to the problem of where they should go, 
for the army once again had need of them. In 
the wake of the Civil War, a much-reduced 
regular army was confronted with a series of 
Indian conflicts throughout most of the vast 
Trans-Mississippi West. On the Texas frontier 
the Comanches and Kiowas had continued their 
traditional raids through the war years and were 
not prepared to give up their accustomed way 
of life for confinement on a reservation. Though 
reduced in numbers by disease, they were still 
the "Lords of the South Plains." They were 
immensely superior in mobility to the U.S. 
Cavalry and were operating in country they 
lived in and knew intimately, but a country 
whites considered a wasteland. Similar prob-
lems confronted the army allover the West, 
and despite the whites' ultimate advantages in 
numbers and technology, military success 
against the hostile nomads often proved elu-
sive.12 
To cope with the problem the army turned 
to the old method of using Indians against 
Indians. The Army Act of 1866 contained a 
provision for the enlistment of Indians "to act 
as scouts" for a period of up to six months, 
during which time they would receive the pay 
and rations of regular cavalrymen. The act 
simply regularized a practice the army had fol-
lowed intermittently and haphazardly since its 
founding. Captain John Lee, commanding Fort 
Griffin in 1869, considered the Tonkawas a 
"great acquisition to scouting parties" because 
of their tracking skills, knowledge of the 
country, and understanding of the ways of the 
hostile tribes. Whatever success had been ob-
tained by forces operating out of Fort Griffin, 
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Lee believed, was in large measure due to the 
Tonkawa trailers. Like other Indian scouts, 
they made it possible for the regulars to fmd 
and strike the hostiles, taking away at least 
some of the enemy's former advantages of 
invisibility and surprise. Thus after 1867 the 
Tonkawas settled near Fort Griffm in their 
own village, with a number of the able-bodied 
men regularly reenlisted as scouts. 13 
The benefits for the Tonkawas were obvious. 
They had nowhere else to go and no friends 
among the Indians except the Lipans. They had 
always lived by hunting buffalo and deer, 
believing that their first ancestor had been 
brought into the world by the wolves and that 
they must always live as the wolves did, never 
settling down and farming. Yet if they ventured 
on the plains to hunt, the far stronger Coman-
ches would seize every opportunity to destroy 
them. With only 150 persons left, they could 
not afford any more losses. Their only safety 
lay with the army, and fortunately the army 
had need of their skills. The arrangement was 
mutually advantageous, and the Tonkawa tribe 
became a little military colony like that of the 
Romans and very similar to those founded by 
Spain in the Spanish borderlands.14 
The Tonkawas did not care to venture far 
from the fort except in company with mili-
tary columns. Because of this they were judged 
cowards, a charge frequently made in the past. 
Whites failed to understand that the Tonkawas, 
like most Indians, believed it more sensible to 
live to fight another day than to sacrifice them-
selves heroically. The kind of bravery exempli-
fied at the Alamo and by Pickett's Charge ap-
peared to them the height of insanity; they 
preferred to make their enemy die for his 
cause and to get out when the situation became 
unfavorable. The Tonkawas, in particular, could 
not afford attrition. On one occasion in 1839, 
when some Texans and Tonkawas trapped a 
group of hostiles. in a thicket, the Texans sug-
gested that the Tonkawas enter the brush and 
flush out the enemy for the Texans to shoot. 
The Tonkawa chief replied that there were 
simply not enough Tonkawas to spare for him 
to follow such procedures. There were instances 
when a few of the Tonkawas, adorned with 
war-paint, feathers, and buffalo-horn head-
dresses, charged the enemy with loud war-
whoops-but they did so with the backing of 
their blue-coated comrades.1S 
As it often happened when Indian-white 
relations were other than simple hostility, the 
whites' perceptions and emotions about the 
Tonkawas were ambivalent. Trooper James 
McConnell described them as the "disgusting 
remnant" of their tribe, but added that they 
had one good quality-they had always been 
"true and loyal" to the whites. Lieutenant 
Robert Carter, who served with Colonel Ranald 
Mackenzie's Fourth Cavalry and saw a lot of 
them, always described the Tonkawas in 
terms that made them appear amusing and 
rather contemptible (he sawall Indians in that 
light), even in recounting a Tonkawa charge 
that probably saved his life and the lives of 
several other troopers. But Carter's detailed 
accounts of Mackenzie's campaigns also made 
it clear just how indispensable the despised 
"Tonks" were, and this conclusion was sup-
ported by Mackenzie's own corre6Pondence 
and the post records of Fort Griffin.1 
Civilians were similarly ambivalent. They 
tended to see the Tonkawas as dirty and re-
pulsive, and most failed to excuse their begging 
as a result of their poverty. D. A. Nance, a 
local settler, had known the tribe in his child-
hood and always considered them his friends, 
boys he had grown up with. His Louisiana-
reared wife, however, never got over her fears 
that they would kidnap her children, in whom 
the Indians took an intense and no doubt 
friendly interest. Miner Kellogg, an artist travel-
ing through the country in 1872, was also 
disgusted by their appearance and habits, yet 
he also thought that the government had not 
adequately repaid them for their loyalty and 
services. Most witnesses from the Fort Griffin 
years saw them as drunken and debauched, and 
realized they probably suffered various diseases 
from their contacts with whites.17 
The habits that disgusted whites apparently 
no longer included cannibalism; at any rate, 
there are no accounts of the practice after the 
incident that supposedly led to the 1862 
massacre. Witnesses reported that the Tonkawas 
wore Comanche finger-bones and ears as orna-
ments, in addition to scalps, but in this they 
were not unique among plains tribes. At the 
same time, they seem to have made dolls for 
their children that incorporated portions of 
Comanche scalps. On at least one occasion, 
after troops and scouts had returned from a 
successful foray, the Tonkawas held a scalp 
dance at their village that was attended by 
members of the garrison and local civilians, 
who thus tacitly joined in celebrating the de-
18 feat of the common enemy. 
In the late 1860s and early 1870s the 
Tonkawas participated in innumerable patrols, 
pursuits, and campaigns out of Fort Griffin 
and Fort Richardson, the next post north and 
east in the cordon that theoretically shielded 
the Texas frontier. They sometimes com-
prised as much as half of the smaller expedi-
tions and necessarily participated in the fighting 
as well as the scouting duties. Indeed, since 
they were the advance portion of any column, 
they were likely to be the first in contact with 
the enemy. They realized this as well as anyone, 
and yet "civilian" Tonkawas as well as enlisted 
scouts were eager to accompany military col-
umns. Even if the need to escape the boredom 
and forced confinement of the post supplied 
part of their motivation, it is hard to sustain 
the charge of cowardice. Their experience in 
such warfare often made them the best men 
for certain difficult tasks. When Mackenzie's 
men in 1871 trapped two Comanches in rough 
country on the eastern edge of the Staked 
Plains, the colonel became impatient with the 
scouts' slowness in disposing of them and tried 
to supervise their efforts personally. His re-
ward was an arrow in the thigh. He then let the 
"Tonks" do it their own way, and by acrobatic 
maneuvering above the enemy, they soon fin-
ished off the two warriors who would not 
surrender. 19 
The climax of the Tonkawas' service came in 
the "Red River War" of 1874. This campaign, 
which was supposed to begin with a Comanche 
revenge raid on the Tonkawas, was originated 
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by the young war leader Quanah to avenge 
the death of a relative at the hands of Tonka-
was and troops earlier in the year. When the 
army received advance warning and brought the 
Tonkawas in close to Fort Griffin, the senior 
Comanche chiefs diverted the enterprise into an 
attack on white buffalo hunters, who by this 
time were recognized as a far greater menace 
than the Tonkawas. In the army's subsequent 
campaign to end the wars of the southern 
plains, five columns converged on the head-
waters of the Red River along the eastern side 
of the Staked Plains in the Texas Panhandle. 
The columns, commanded by Ranald Mackenzie 
and Lieutenant Colonel George Buell, were 
guided by Tonkawas. Indian scouts (Tonkawas, 
Seminole Negroes, and Lipans) guided Mac-
kenzie to the hostiles' refuge in the Palo Duro 
Canyon. Mackenzie noted that his scouts en-
gaged in hazardous reconaissances as far as 
forty miles from the main column, and he 
thought it only proper to award the captured 
horses to them in compensation for the risk. 
Buell's column had less spectacular success, 
but harassed the fugitive Indians and helped 
convince them that surrender was inevitable. 
Unquestionably this result was in large part due 
to the scouts' ability to locate the hostiles. The 
Tonkawas also accompanied Lieutenant Colonel 
William Shafter's movements that "mopped 
up" the last remaining fugitives on the Staked 
Plains. 20 
Their very success, however, destroyed the 
Tonkawas' occupation. As, the demand for 
their services dwindled, they confronted an 
enemy more deadly than the Comanches-
starvation. 
From the beginning of the tribe's residence 
at Fort Griffin, the post commanders had 
issued rations to all. Since men who were not 
enrolled as scouts voluntarily joined expedi-
tions, this was a reasonable recompense. In 
1872, however, the adjutant general's office in 
Washington issued a general order that army 
posts could no longer provide rations for In-
dians other than enlisted scouts. The post 
commander at Fort Griffin, Colonel W. H. 
Wood, evaded the order. He explained to 
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Headquarters, Department of Texas, that 
ration issues to the Tonkawas had been 
customary since the post was established, that 
their status was special since the men were 
scouts, and that he wanted to find out if the 
order applied in this case before carrying it out. 
Wood's evasive maneuvers provided the Ton-
kawas with food for another two years, but in 
1874 the prohibition was reiterated. colonel 
George Buell, the current post commander, 
inquired about the matter in early 1875 and 
received the answer that the Tonkawas were 
not excepted. 21. 
Buell, who was noted in the army for his 
care for those under his command, was dis-
tressed; the Tonkawas had served under him on 
various expeditions, and he was loath to watch 
them starve on his doorstep. It was true that 
in the past two years the Department ofInterior 
had authorized the expenditure of $700 to pur-
cHase sheep and cattle for the tribe, but these 
herds had not reached the point where they 
could make the Indians self-sustaining. That 
summer it was necessary to issue beef rations to 
the tribe, even though there was no appropria-
tion or authorization. Lieutenant Colonel John 
Davidson, who temporarily replaced Buell 
during the summer, commented on the good 
service the Tonkawas had rendered and sug-
gested that they be given a reservation and sup-
ported in some way. In the fall Colonel Buell 
described the condition of the 119 Tonkawas 
and 26 Lipans at Griffin as "deplorable" and 
said that, if necessary, he wished to appeal 
directly to the President for some sort of ac-
tion. Again citing their services, he said that, 
while he disclaimed "any intention to reflect on 
any branch of the government" (a rather ob-
vious reflection on the Bureau ofIndian Affairs) 
he thought someone ought to care for these In-
dians. As various army officers pointed out to 
the Department of Interior, there was the possi-
bility that the Tonkawas would turn to depre-
dations on the settlers rather than starve, and 
the army did not want the responsibility to rest 
on its shoulders. General Philip Sheridan, not 
noted for his overflowing sympathy for Indians, 
endorsed these statements, calling the Tonka-
was "a most deserving people, probably the 
most so of any Indians we have.,,22 
The juggling of responsibility continued for 
nearly a decade. The bureau would only assume 
responsibility for the Tonkawas if it could 
move them to Indian Territory or to the Mes-
calero Apache Reservation in New Mexico. An 
additional appropriation for livestock in 1875 
saved the tribe from starvation. They did not 
become farmers, however, nor did they move to 
Indian Territory. They steadfastly opposed a 
return to the territory because they feared 
another massacre like that of 1862. As for be-
coming farmers (the official government policy 
for all Indians), they had no experience and 
perhaps were too psychologically battered to 
try. The myth of the wolves' injunction to their 
ancestors explains their feelings about their 
way of life, and it was the basis of his reply 
when an army colonel asked Captain Charlie 
why the Tonkawas did not farm and build 
houses. Charlie responded by asking why the 
colonel did not do the same. When he re-
plied that as an officer and a soldier he did not 
have to work, Charlie declared that he too was 
a fighting man and did not have to work. 
His answer helps explain why the military 
frequently achieved greater empathy with the 
Indians. than did civilian missionaries and 
humanitarians. 23 
There are only a few such humanizing 
glimpses of the Tonkawas during this period. 
White witnesses were generally content to 
describe them as amusing or disgusting as a 
group. Miner Kello'gg reported that Chief 
Campo was supposedly 117 years old in 1872 
and a veteran of the Battle of New Orleans. 
William died of pneumonia while on detached 
service in 1873. When Chief Castile and other 
Tonkawas complained that the illness was due 
to brutal mistreatment by a white cavalry ser-
geant, Colonel Buell forwarded the complaints 
with a demand for action. The sergeant's 
company commander backed his version of 
events, and apparently there was no further 
action. 
Most of these Indians were known to the 
whites only by Spanish and English nicknames: 
Placido and Camp 0, McCord, Job, Johnson, 
Old Henry, and Canteen. Indeed, they may 
have found these a convenience because of 
taboos relating to the use of names, particular-
ly those of the dead. There are some indica-
tions of sardonic humor, like that of Captain 
Charlie-even of their playing on the whites' 
horror of their cannibalism for a joke. For the 
most part, however, they are not individualized 
as people who loved, feared, fought, and suf-
fered. Most sources describe the Tonkawas as 
small and slim, as contrasted with the stocky 
Comanches-a description supported to som~ 
extent by photographs, generally taken some 
years after the Indian wars. Some of them 
certainly drank hard in those years, trying the 
patience of even the appreciative Colonel 
Buell. 24 
The Tonkawas remained at Fort Griffin until 
1884 with an army officer assigned as de facto 
agent, while the bureaucracy thrashed out an 
acceptable solution. In 1880 a delegation from 
the tribe inspected various locations in Indian 
Territory but were not pleased with any avail-
able area. They expressed fear of the Coman-
ches and indicated a preference for their 
native homeland, Texas. Eventually they agreed 
to accept a reserve remote from the Comanches 
and near a military post. In 1884 the govern-
ment installed the ninety-two remaining Ton-
kawas on the Iowa reservation in Indian Terri-
tory. The Iowas, however, protested that their 
rights were violated, and the following year the 
Tonkawas were transferred to a tract of land 
where the Nez Perces had been confined after 
their conflict with the United States in 1877. 
The settlement that became Tonkawa, Okla-
homa, was founded and the Tonkawas at last 
ceased to obey the wolves' injunction to 
roam. 25 
Whites often expressed the belief that the 
Tonkawas were doomed to extinction, and 
their steadily dwindling numbers seemed to 
bear this out. In the period immediately follow-
ing their return to Texas during the Civil War, 
it was observed that there were no births among 
them. Some whites speculated that the women 
were "controverting the course of nature" by 
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the use of herbs, rather than bearing children 
to be killed by their enemies. The presence of 
dolls among them a few years later, however, 
suggests that such a practice was not universal. 
By the early 1930s there were only six of some 
forty considered to be Tonkawas, all past mid-
dle age, who could speak the language. Since a 
number of Lipans were associated with them, 
the chances of preserving any pure Tonkawa 
line seemed dim. Nevertheless, forty years 
later there were fifty-seven people who called 
themselves Tonkawas.26 
The Tonkawas' relationship with the Anglo-
Americans was peculiar, though not without 
parallel. Their difficult position in relation to 
other Texas tribes, as well as their declining 
strength, forced them into increasing depen-
dence on the only group that could or would 
offer them any protection or hope of survival. 
Texas historian T. R. Fehrenbach condemns 
them for indulging their hatred of the Coman-
ches by serving the whites, even when they 
knew "what sort of gratitude" they could 
expect. 27 This seems a harsh judgement on 
people caught in a truly desperate situation. If 
their cannibalism aroused the hatred of the 
neighboring tribes, the resulting persecution 
very likely aroused both the hatred and the 
need for supernatural reassurance that perpet-
uated the practice of cannibalism. If the Tonka-
was' troubles were in some degree of their own 
making, the same could be said of most of us. 
Since both the Indians and the whites saw the 
Tonkawas through the haze of their own pre-
conceptions, they continued to see just what 
they expected. Perhaps the universality of this 
human failing is the principal lesson to be 
learned from the story of the Tonkawas. 
The Tonkawas illustrate that Indian-white 
conflict was not always as simple as we imagine. 
The Tonkawas, for good reason, did not per-
ceive their interests to be the same as those of 
other Indians. The same was true of many other 
tribes who sought cooperation or alliance with 
the whites. Likewise not all whites, or even all 
frontiersmen, reacted alike to Indians. Some who 
were in closest contact with Indians realized 
that among them there were great differences. 
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For pragmatic reasons, and perhaps sometimes 
because of simple friendship and humanity, 
they found ways to cooperate with some In-
dians. Naturally they perceived their friends 
and allies as "good Indians," regardless of what 
they thought of the others. For the Tonkawas 
the basic motive in the arrangement was survi-
val. Without the alliance, as they saw it, there 
would have been no Tonkawas. 
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